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b) Current workers' and pensioners' liabilities 
These  represent  the  sum  of the  present  value  of accrued  rights  of workers  and 
pensioners, plus the present value of  the rights acquired in the future by present workers, 
minus the present value of  future contributions of  present workers (CW). 
While there is no change in LP, L  W becomes 
2  100  t+80 
LWt = E  2:  Mj,s  Bj,s  E Qi,j,s  Si,j,s  ((l+p)/(l+r)) i-t 
s=l  j=20  i=t 
where  Bj,s represents the average pension paid at retirement to workers of  sex s and 
age j in year t computed on the basis of  full working life. 
The present value of future contributions of present workers (assuming nobody retires 
after 70) is equal to 
2  70  t+80 
CWt =  2:  E  Mj,s  C 
s=l  j=20 
r,  R"  Y· ·  (l+p)/(l+r))i-t  t,j,S  I,J,S 
i=-t 
where  C is the contributory rate on labour income 
Rj~j,s represents the probability of  working in year i for workers of  sex s and 
age j in year t 
.......  ~~re!;ents the labour income in year i of  workers of  sex s and age j in year 
Denoting with superscript "b" this definition of  liabilities: 
Lb = LPa + LPsa + LPCa + LWb + LWSb + LWJb- cwb 
c) Open-system liabilities 
These include the present  value of accrued  and  future  rights of present workers and 
pensioners, the present value of future contributions of  present workers and the present 
value of contributions (CWN) and pension (LWN) of new workers.  The latter can be 
defined in many ways. 
In case only children living at year tare considered: 
2  19 
LWN1= E  E 
s=I  j=I 
100 
Tj,s  Bj,s  :E  Vi,j,s  Si,j,s  ((l+p)/{l+r)) i-t 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years a number of  studies have estimated the liabilities of  public pay-as-you-go 
(P  A  YG) pension schemes  I  and have  argued that these liabilities should be taken into 
account when evaluating the state and the perspectives of public finances.2  It has been 
shown that in most countries the "pension-debt" is much greater than the conventional 
public debt and that "the inclusion of the capitalized net pension liabilities  in  a wider 
definition of  debt would ... change the assessment of  relative debt positions of different 
countries. "3  It has  been  claimed  that  "the  strains  that  higher  dependency  ratios  will 
impose on budget policies can be seen by examining  the present value of future  net 
liabilities of  the pension systems in the major industrial countries. "4 
These estimates and suggestions are closely related to several  theoretical  studies that 
have  pointed  to  the  deficiencies  of conventional  cash-flow  deficit  measures  in  the 
assessment of  fiscal impact and of  budgetary sustainability.  As to the former matter, it 
has been claimed that "conventional deficit measures are likely to be deficient indicators 
of  fiscal impact except under extreme assumptions regarding private sector behaviour --
for example,  myopia regarding the future implications of current government policy or 
liquidity constraints. "5  As to sustainability,  it has been suggested that,  "by  relying  on 
conventional accounting methods, budgetary authorities may not be provided with the 
means to adequately monitor and control the government's overall fiscal position. "6 
In  order  to  overcome  these  difficulties  it  has  often  been  prescribed  to  resort  to 
"economic deficit"  or to "government net worth. "7 Both these solutions would require 
the inclusion of pensions in fiscal  accounts when obligations  are incurred rather than 
when  the  actual  expenditure  is  made. 8  In  order  to  evaluate  economic  deficit, 
contributions to P  A  YG schemes would have to be classified as a financing item,  while 
pensions would be considered as a loan repayment or as an interest payment. Any change 
in the present value of pension liabilities would immediately influence government net 
worth. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
For the seven major western countries see Van den Noord and Herd (1993  and  1994),  for European Union 
countries Kune, Petit and Pinxt ( 1993), for Japan, Germany, Sweden and the United States see Hagemann and 
Nicoletti (1989), for the UK Hills (1984), for Italy Castellino (1985), Be1trametti (1993) and Rostagno (1995). 
Some papers providing estimates for Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia and Turkey are indicated in World 
Bank (1994 ).  The papers by Van den Noord and Herd and by Hagemann and Nicoletti were prepared within 
OECD. 
See Van den Noord and Herd (1993), IMF (1993), Hoffmann (1993) and Castellino (1985). 
Van den Noord and Herd (1993, p. 31). 
IMF (1993, p. 56). The IMF refers to the estimates presented in the paper by Van den Noord and Herd. 
Towe (1991, p.  116). 
Towe (1991, p. 110) 
See, respectively, Kotlikoff(1984) and  Buiter (1983). For a critique see Mackenzie (1989). For a survey see 
Towe (1991) and  Blejer - Cheasty ( 1991). 
The same methodology would be applied to all "contingent liabilities". A contingent liability can be defmed as 
a public sector action that detemrines a cash expenditure only if  and when a certain event takes place. Despite this theoretical and empirical work, budgetary policy is still usually defined and 
evaluated in terms of conventional deficit and debt measures. 9 Public pension schemes 
liabilities  are  usually  ignored.  For  instance,  there  is  no  provision  for  them  in  the 
Convergence  criteria for  European Monetary Union.1 o  This  means  that,  at  least  in 
theory, a country could adhere to the Union while accumulating pension liabilities that 
might endanger its public finance balance in the future. 
This paper reviews the literature concerning pension liabilities in order to assess their 
potential role in  the evaluation of budgetary policy.  It addresses' chiefly the matter of 
budgetary sustainability  .11 
Section 2 examines the main definitions of  pension liabilities (see Annex): a) accrued-to-
date  liabilities,  b)  present  pensioners'  and  workers'  liabilities,  and  c)  open-system 
liabilities  (i.e.,  liabilities inclusive of the present value of benefits and  contributions of 
new  workers).  Section  3  reviews  some  recent  studies  providing  internationally 
comparable data concerning the scale of  pension-debt; it also compares their results with 
those of some national estimates.  Sections 4 and  5 address the economic relevance of, 
respectively,  accrued and future liabilities.  Section 6 focuses on the issue of  the use of 
pension liabilities in the assessment of  fiscal policy. 
The main conclusions of  the paper are the following. 
a)  There are practical and theoretical reasons for not including pension liabilities in the 
deficit and the debt measures that are used in defining and evaluating current fiscal 
policy. The same arguments should apply to Convergence criteria. 
b)  Estimates of pension liabilities may nevertheless represent a useful  complement to 
conventional debt and deficit measures. They bring a clearer understanding of  fiscal 
impact on consumption and  saving  ratios,  and  of some  aspects of the economic 
situation ofPAYG schemes. 
c)  Neither  accrued-to-date  liabilities  nor  discounted  future  liabilities  represent  an 
indicator of the  sustainability  of pension  policy  and  of P  A  YG pension  schemes' 
present or future pressure on the budgets. 
d)  Accrued-to-date liabilities are useful for the measurement of economic deficits; the 
estimates available for some countries show that in the last few decades economic 
9  With some exceptions represented by New Zealand new Crown Financial Statements and by the introduction 
of  a chapter on Generational accounting in the U.S. Budget (Office of  Management and Budget, 1994 ). 
10  Public pension schemes liabilities, as a part of the more general problem of budgetary policy sustainability, 
may  enter  in  the  Convergence  criteria  indirectly,  through  Article  104c(3).  This  article  requires  that  in 
preparing the report concerning the Member States not fulfilling the debt and deficit criteria, the Commission 
should take into  account  government  investment expenditure and  "all other relevant factors,  including the 
medium term economic and budgetary position of  the Member State". 
11  As to the defmition of sustainability see Blanchard et al.  (1990).  The effects of pension liabilities on fiscal 
impact have  been examined by  the extensive economic  literature concerning  the  effect  of "social  secmity 
wealth". 
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deficits have been much larger than conventional cash flow deficits. Accrued-to-date 
liabilities also provide a measure of  the cost of  terminating P  A  YG pension schemes; 
their present size shows that in many countries any large scale shift from PAYG to 
funded  schemes  would  be  extremely  burdensome  for  the  generation  of workers 
involved. 
e)  Present  pensioners'  and  workers'  liabilities,  which  correspond  to  Social  Security 
Wealth, are relevant for the assessment of  fiscal effects on saving decisions. 
f)  Open-system liabilities, which include new net expected pension rights,  provide a 
measure of the difference between the implicit  return on contributions to P A  YG 
schemes and  some rate of return assumed  as  a benchmark.  Estimates of new net 
rights do not provide any measure of present and future cash imbalances,  nor do 
they provide information on the need to adjust contribution rates or benefit rules, or 
on pressures on the budget. 
g)  The  medium-term  perspectives of pension  systems,  and  the  pressure  of pension 
schemes on the budgets, might be examined with indicators that are more relevant, 
simpler and more transparent than pension liabilities. The expenditure to GDP ratio 
and  the contribution rate which  assures the cash balance of the pension  scheme 
would be appropriate.  The benefit return on the contributions to PA  YG schemes 
should  also  be computed  and  compared with the sum of the rates of growth of 
average wage and employment. 
h)  Although  pension  schemes  are  likely  to  exert  the  greatest  strain  on  western 
countries'  budgets  in  the  next  few  decades,  budgetary  sustainability  should  be 
assessed more precisely and  comprehensively with  an  accounting framework  that 
considers all budgetary items. This approach would also avoid some methodological 
difficulties  encountered in defining  the future  revenues of pension  schemes.  The 
economic effects of  ageing might also be examined with general equilibrium models, 
taking  the  interaction of households,  producers,  and  government  behaviour  into 
account. 
i)  Internationally comparable indicators of  pension liabilities should be developed along 
the lines indicated in recent studies on the matter.  Although international  studies 
have been very useful in promoting an interest in pension liabilities, their estimates 
are not satisfactory. They differ greatly from those of  more analytic national studies. 
The amount of  information required to estimate pension liabilities is such that it can 
be properly assessed only with the support of  national experts. 
2. Definitions 
Any  pay-as-you-go  pension  scheme12  gives  rise  to unfunded  liabilities.  Within  these 
schemes each generation provides the resources for paying the pensions of  older workers 
12  It  is "a pension finance arrangement whereby CWTent liabilities are met from CWTent contributions, and no fund 
is accumulated in advance to meet future needs" (Dilnot et al.  1994, p. 212). and later receives pensions  financed by younger workers. 13  Therefore,  at any point in 
time there exists  a  number  of retired  citizens  who  are  entitled  to a  pension  for  the 
remaining part of  their life (and sometimes also of  the life of  their widowed spouse) and a 
number of working citizens who can claim  a right to a pension in the near or distant 
future.  The  debt  arises  with  the  creation  of the  PAYG  pension  scheme,  when  a 
generation  of elderly  citizens  receives  a  pension  without  having  paid  any  previous 
contributionl4. 
It should be stressed that there is nothing inherently negative in the existence of  unfunded 
pension liabilities.  The  matter should  be judged in  terms of the  efficiency  of P  A  YG 
schemes15 and their role in achieving society's equity objectives. 
There exist three main definitions of  pension liabilities  16. 
a)  Accrued-to-date liabilities: these represent the present value of pensions to be paid 
in  the  future  on the  basis  of accrued  rights;  neither  the  future  contributions of 
existing workers, nor the accrual of  new rights by them are considered. 
b)  Current workers and  pensioners' liabilities:  in  this case it is  assumed that pension 
schemes  continue  their  "existence  until  the  last  contributor  dies,  while  no  new 
entrants are allowed" 17; both the future contributions of  existing members and their 
new rights are therefore allowed for under current rules18. 
c)  Open-system liabilities:  these also  include  the  present  value  of contributions  and 
pensions of new workers under current rules;  the range of options extends from 
including only children not yet in the labour force, to an infinite perspective. 
The  methodology  for  estimating  pension  liabilities  according  to  the  three  different 
definitions  is  examined  in  the  Annex.  Clearly,  estimates  require  a  large  amount  of 
detailed  information about the distribution of workers and  pensioners as  to age,  sex, 
wage  and  contributory  periods.  It  is  also  clear  that  the  results  depend  on  several 
hypotheses  concerning  mortality  rates,  activity  rates,  wage  and  price  trends.  The 
discount rate of  future contributions and benefits is also very important. Estimates should 
obviously  take into  account  the  specific  pension  rules  of each  country.  Within  each 
country, specific estimates should be produced for each pension scheme, in case pension 
schemes have different rules. 
13  In some cmmtries public PAYG schemes provide pensions to all citizens.  In these  cases  one  should more 
properly refer to "younger citizens" and to "older citizens". 
14  In some cases elder citizens had paid contributions to a funded scheme gone bankrupt. This is what happened 
in Germany and Italy after the Second World War, when the previous funded schemes collapsed because of  the 
war and high inflation. 
15  See, for instance, Diamond ( 1977) and Barr (1992). 
16  See Castellino (1985). 
17  Van den Noord-Herd (1993). 
18  This defmition corresponds to the concept of "net social security wealth" developed by Feldstein (1974) and 
frequently referred to in the debate concerning the effects of  social security on saving decisions. 
7 8 
Definitions b) and c) require an assessment of  the expected value of  future contributions. 
In the case of  public pension schemes this may raise a complex methodological problem. 
In some countries current pensions are fully financed by specific contributions to pension 
schemes.  Future contributions can thus be assessed on the basis of present contribution 
rates. In most countries current pensions are also financed from other sources,  such as 
general tax revenues and borrowing. In this case, if  future contributions are assessed on 
the basis of  the contribution rate to pension schemes, there is a tendency to overestimate 
liabilities. The overestimation would be particularly large for the countries relying mostly 
on general taxation.  If, on the other hand, the relevant contributory ratio is assumed to 
be equal  to  the  pension-expenditure  ratio  in  the  base  year,  there  is  a  tendency  to 
underestimate the imbalances of  countries relying on bol!owing. 
It  would  be  better to  try to  assess  future  contributions  on  the  basis  of the  present 
contributory rate to pension schemes plus present recourse to general taxation. In other 
words,  present  recourse  to borrowing  should  be  excluded  from  estimates  of future 
contributions. This method would also involve some arbitrary assumption. 
Two more aspects are relevant in defining pension liabilities: 
i)  in countries where pensions are included in the personal income tax base, liabilities 
should be net of the presumed taxes levied on them; 19 this requires an estimate of 
the average tax rate on pensions;  it has to be  considered that even assuming the 
stability of  the present rate structure in real terms,  2othe average tax rate on pensions 
is likely to change over time since the ratio of  pension to other income may change; 
ii)  in  countries where public  pension  schemes  are  fully  or partially funded,  liabilities 
should be computed net of  pension fund assets. 
3. The scale of  the pension IiabHities 
Tables 1 and 2 contain the estimates of  pension liabilities provided in 1989 by Hagemann 
and Nicoletti, in 1993 by Van den Noord and Herd,  and again in  1993  by Kune et al. 
The first and the second works were p*'pared within the OECD, the third within ABP.21 
In the tables and in this section, they will be referred to respectively as OECD (1989), 
OECD (1993) and  ABP  (1993).  The first  work refers to pension  scheme accounts in 
1985; the others refer  to 1990 accounts. The countries considered do not coincide. Only 
Germany  is  examined  in  all  three  papers.  Before  examining  the  data,  however,  it  is 
necessary to consider some methodological issues. 
The studies are based on a highly simpUfied version of  the methodology presented in the 
Annex. In OECD (1993), for each country a "full pension" (which is actually an average 
I 
19  No such adjustment is necessary for conventiCjmal public debt, since no tax is levied on  public bonds when 
they are refunded.  · 
20  Tax rates are adjusted to income changes in order to keep the tax to income ratio constant. 
I 
21  ABP (Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds) is "e  pension fimd of  the Dutch public employees. The paper was 
prepared forCEPS Working Party on "Financing Retirement Provision in Europe". T
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 pension) is computed dividing total public expenditure on pensions by the number of 
pensioners.  The present value of current pensions is  estimated on the basis of the full 
pension,  of mortality rates,  and of a discount rate.  Pensions are supposed to be held 
constant in real terms. 
In estimating the pension rights of  current workers, OECD (1993) assumes that in each 
country the  standard retirement  age is  60,  and  the  number of years  of contributions 
required for a full  pension22 is 40. It also assumes that pension entitlements accrue at a 
constant rate of 1/8 of  the full pension every five contribution years. Present workers are 
grouped in  eight five-year brackets.  The members of each bracket are  assumed to be 
entitled  to the  same  pension  rights.  During  working  life,  pension  entitlements  are 
projected to grow at the same rate as projected real earnings and real output per worker. 
This means that the ratio of  the average new pension to real earnings per worker is held 
constant.  An  exception is  made for Canada and  the United Kingdom  "where pension 
rates undergo a structural upgrading. "23 
ABP  ( 1993) follows  broadly  the  same  lines.  Standard  retirement  age  is  nevertheless 
assumed  to be  65,  and  no  structural upgrading  is  considered.  In OECD  (1993)  the 
different PAYG schemes existing in each country are considered as a single  "average" 
system; in the ABP paper the present value of  pension rights is estimated separately for 
public sector and private sector workers. 
In OECD (1993) the discount rate is 4 per cent in real terms in the period 1990-2010; 
after that,  it gradually declines reaching  3 per cent in  2050.  An  alternative projection 
with a discount rate 1. 5 per cent higher than in the baseline is also presented. In OECD 
(1989) the discount rate is set at 2 per cent for Germany, Sweden and the US and at 3.5 
per cent for Japan. The ABP's discount rate is 4 per cent for the whole projection period. 
In all the papers some assumptions are clearly unsatisfactory. 
a)  In many  countries  younger  pensioners,  who  obviously  live  longer,  receive,  on 
average,  higher  pensions  than  older  ones.  The  assumption  that  pension  level  is 
uniform  tends  to underestimate the present  value  of current  pensioners'  rights. 
Besides, the use of  the current average pension as the term of  reference for the level 
of  future pensions may lead to erroneous estimates. Estimates may turn out too low 
if  pension levels undergo a structural upgrading, and too high if  rules concerning the 
level of  new pensions have been tightened. 
b)  In some countries (like Germany and Italy up to 1992) pensions are also indexed to 
real  wage  increases.  Holding  pensions  constant  in  real  terms  determines  an 
underestimate of  liabilities.  24 
22  That is for a pension equal to the 1990 average pension. 
23  Structural upgrading may depend on younger generations of citizens retiring with longer contributory periods 
or with more favourable rules concerning the detennination of  the pension paid. 
24  Van den Noord and Herd (1994) provide an estimate of the pension liabilities of the seven major western 
countries under the assumption that all pension benefits after retirement are indexed to  earnings.  Accrued 
pension liabilities are 10 to 20 per cent higher than in the case of  price indexation. 
ll 12 
c)  OECD (1989) and OECD (1993) do not provide separate estimates for public and 
private sector workers. This may lead to some underestimation of  liabilities since  in 
many countries in the last decades public employment has grown faster than total 
employment, and  public employees usually have better retirement rules. 
d)  The APB paper does not take into account that some pension systems may not yet 
have  reached  maturity  (i.e.,  that  the  ratio  of average  new  pensions  to  average 
earnings may increase over time); OECD (1989) considers structural upgrading for 
Japan and Sweden; OECD (1993) considers it for Canada and the UK.25 
Table I contains the estimates of accrued pension liabilities according to OECD (1993) 
and ABP  (1993).  The data concerning the four major EU Member  States  show that 
estimates vary considerably: UK's liability ranges between 42 and 139 per cent of  GDP, 
France's  between  69  and  216.  OECD  provides  the  highest  estimates  and  ABP  the 
lowest.  The ranking of the four countries changes:  Germany comes first  according to 
ABP, third according to OECD. 
In OECD's estimates,  pensioners' rights represent 30 to 40 per cent of total rights.  In 
ABP's estimates,  civil  servants' rights represent 40 per cent of total pension rights  in 
Belgium, Germany, and France. It  is a much higher percentage than their incidence in the 
labour  force.  This  supports  the  view  that  pension  liabilities  ought  to  be  estimated 
separately for all the major schemes with different rules existing in any country. 
Table 2 shows some estimates of  pension liabilities according to definitions b) and c) (as 
listed in Section 2). It should be noted that ABP estimates do not take into account the 
future  flow  of contributions to P  A  YG schemes.  This  tends  to overestimate  pension 
liabilities.  OECD  ( 1993)  assumes  that  in  five  of the  seven  countries  considered, 
contributions to PAYG schemes are going to be equal,  with respect to GDP,  to the 
incidence of  their expenditure on GDP in 1990.26 This means that no part of 1990 public 
budget deficits is attributed to public pension schemes. There follows an underestimation 
of  future liabilities of pension schemes.  For the two remaining countries  contributions 
are  computed  at  present  rates.  The  latter  methodology  is  also  applied  by  OECD 
(1989).27 
OECD  (1993)  provides an account with estimates regarding  a)  present workers,  b) 
children not yet in the workforce, and c) unborn citizens.  According to the paper:  "A 
positive number in such an account implies a net debt ·or the government to a specific 
generation, and hence a net transfer of wealth to that generation.  Similarly,  a negative 
number represents a net debt of a particular generation to the government and hence a 
25  As regards Italy, for instance, only one third of  the increase in the ratio of  public pension expenditure to GDP 
between 1960 and 1990 may be attributed to demographic changes (Franco, 1993 ). The increase in the pension 
to GDP ratio that was forecast before the 1992 pension reform was also largely attributed to the maturation of 
pension schemes. 
26  The countries are Canada, France, Gennany, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
27  As to the US, legislated future increases contribution rates are taken into account. net  transfer  of wealth  to  that  generation. "28This  interpretation  of the  data  will  be 
examined in Section 5. 
According  to  these  estimates,  in  Canada  and  Japan  rights  for  new  generations  are 
accruing faster than contributions. Some adjustment to contribution rates or benefit rules 
would therefore be necessary in order to avoid new transfers of  resources to pensioners. 
In France and Germany "accruals of  contributions would broadly match new accruals of 
pension rights (while leaving the existing accruals unfinanced). "29 In Italy,  the United 
Kingdom and the United States future generations have already "been called to transfer 
wealth to current generations." This does not imply that in the latter countries there is 
scope for improving benefits or for cutting contribution rates. 
OECD (1989) provides an estimate of  the unfunded pension liabilities of all individuals 
aged  17 to 90 years in  1985. Its results should be comparable with the sum of OECD 
( 1993) accrued rights and new net rights of  the present workforce. Again, the estimates 
differ very much:  355  per cent of GDP  in  OECD  (1989) as  against  149 per cent in 
OECD (1993) for Germany,  158 per cent as against 91  per cent for the USA, 217 per 
cent as against  173  per cent for Japan.  A part of the difference surely depends on the 
assumptions about the discount rate. In the case of Germany it may also depend on the 
different methodologies used in estimating future contributions. 
The different solutions adopted by OECD ( 1993) and ABP ( 1993) for evaluating future 
contributions  also  explain  the  different  results  in  Table  1  and  Table  2.  As  already 
mentioned in Section 2, both solutions are rather unsatisfactory. 
Table 3 contains some data on the assets of  public pension schemes and on tax claims on 
private pensions. Tax claims on public pensions are usually assumed to be 20 per cent of 
these  pensions30.  Altogether in  the Netherlands,  the UK,  the USA and  Japan,  these 
corrective factors range from one third to two thirds of  GDP. 
Table 4 reports the results of  some estimates of  pension liabilities carried out at national 
level  in  more  analytical  terms.  UK  and  Italian  estimates are rather larger than those 
presented in  Tables  1 and  2.31  In the  case of Italy there is  a  huge  difference  in  the 
estimates of  liabilities existing before the 1992 pension reform and in the estimates of  the 
effects of the reform.  OECD (1993) results concerning Italy,  which also  contrast with 
those  of other  studies  concerning  the  perspectives  of the  Italian  pension  system32, 
28  OECD (1993, p. 54). 
29  But this would not matter as long as the PAYG systems were not tenninated. 
30  Bovemberg - Petersen ( 1992 ), Hofinann ( 1993). 
31  The gross liabilities of  Italian pension schemes have~  estimated also in Pench (1993), which discounts the 
flow of expected pension expenditure up to the year  2025.  The paper aims  at evaluating  the permanent 
(seignorage-adjusted) primary surplus excluding pensions required to insure fiscal policy  sustainability, for 
that reason it does not deduct future contributions from future expenditure. 
32  INPS ( 1993 ), Ragioneria Generate dello Stato ( 1994  ), Castellino ( 1994  ). 
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depend largely on the overestimation of  future contribution and on the underestimation 
of  benefits arising from the assumption considered above. 
National studies show that in some countries the ratio of pension liabilities to GDP has 
grown considerably during the last decades; accordingly,  in these countries,  economic 
deficits have been much larger than conventional cash flow deficits. The inclusion of the 
change in  liabilities  in  deficit  statistics would have increased the Italian deficit  by  II 
points of  GDP every year between I97I and I98I and by 5 points every year between 
I98I and I991. 
4. Tbe relevance of  accrued  liabilities 
Among the three definitions of  pension liabilities, that of  Accrued-to-date liabilities is the 
only one which can be assimilated to conventional public debt.  It can be argued that 
"from the worker's point of  view, social security 'tax' contributions are, in most respects, 
equivalent to the purchase of a government liability. "33  To support this view it can be 
claimed that an abrupt end to or a radical change in a PAYG scheme would impose large 
adjustment costs and personal hardships to pensioners and workers who have taken their 
savings and labour supply decisions on the basis of  the existence of  the scheme.  34 
Nevertheless,  accrued  pension  rights  differ  in  many  ways  from  conventional  public 
debt.35 
a)  While the timing of  the repayment of  public bonds as well as the amount to be paid 
to the holders are fixed in advance, those of  pension liabilities are uncertain.  36 They 
depend  on decisions  made  by  the  holders  of the  entitlements  (concerning,  for 
instance, the age of retirement, where some flexibility  is allowed) and on various 
types of  events (those concerning the length of  life, wage and price dynamics,etc.).37 
b)  Pension rights are not embodied in formal contracts. The debtor can modify both the 
timing and the amount of  the payment. While failure to repay financial liabilities may 
give rise to legal  claims and political reactions, the repudiation of PA  YG pension 
liabilities may raise only the latter.  38 In some circumstances workers and pensioners 
33  Kotlikoff ( 1984, p. 567). 
34  According to Bolm (1992, p. 4), "One should distinguish between a social-security system in its start-up phase, 
where the first generation of participants receive substantial 'unearned' benefits, and a more mature system. 
Since promises to make gift are generally Wlenforceable, the benefits promised in the start-up phase C81U10t be 
considered government liabilities. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine that a government could cancel 
the social-security benefits of  retirees who have made social security contributions throughout their life." This 
distinction, although appealing, is not easily applied. 
35  The subject is extensively examined in Rizzo (1985). See also Pedone (1987) and Bohn (1992). 
36  For a general analysis of  govemment contingent liabilities see Towe ( 1991 ). 
37  The elasticity of  pensions to price and wage changes is frequently different from 1. 
38  On the political-economy of support to pension expenditure see Buchanan (1983), Rizzo (1985) and Tabellini 
(1990). (3) 
may  accept (or may  be unable to avoid)  a reduction in  their pension rights.  The 
Italian pension reform of 1992 provides a clear case: 30 per cent of  the pension-debt 
was wiped out at a time when public finances were considered to be in a very critical 
situation. 
c)  While  public  bonds  are  usually  bought  freely  on  the  market  by  individuals  or 
companies, the acquisition of  pension rights is usually compulsory. This means that a 
large pension-debt does not determine any direct pressure on the financial markets.  39 
It also implies that the debt is automatically renewed. 
d)  Pension rights are not tradable. This implies that changes in the relative yield and the 
relative  risk  of pension  rights  comparatively  to  other  assets  have  no  effect  on 
financial  markets. It also implies less protection for pension-right holders than for 
bond holders. Bohn (1992, p. 45) notes that:  "For government debt, any attempt to 
default  -- outright  or  through  inflation  -- would  imply  undesirable  market 
disruptions.  Such  'protection'  against  default  does  not  exist  for  social-security 
claims. In addition, non tradability implies that social-security claims could be altered 
selectively,  taking  individual  characteristics  (e.g.,  income,  demographics)  into 
account." 
The special treatment accorded to future pension expenditure may also be disputed.  To 
some  extent,  all  spending  programmes  create  implicit  contracts  containing  future 
liabilities. Penner (1982, p.  234) notes that: "One might argue that the degree of  political 
commitment to future pensions is somewhat stronger than to other entitlements in that 
pension benefits seem much harder to cut than other entitlements.  But neither are cut 
very often, and this is admittedly a weak argument." Brittan ( 1993) takes a more radical 
view:  "The  fallacy  of such  estimates  (of pension  liabilities)  is  to  treat  pension 
commitments  differently  from  other  forms  of public  spending.  The  pay-as-you-go 
schemes, from which the scare stories stem,  are based on each generation of workers 
paying through taxes and contributions sufficient to cover the cost of pensions for those 
already retired. Thus, pensions are, like any other form of  rising public expenditure, to be 
met  from  higher  tax  revenue  or social  security  contributions,  or reduced  spending 
elsewhere." 
The ratio of  accrued pension liabilities to GDP is not even a measure of  pension schemes 
sustainability or,  more generally,  of public finance  sustainability.  A high  debt to GDP 
ratio does not necessarily imply an imbalance.in the PAYG pension schemes or in the 
budget.  Nor does  it  imply  that an  imbalance  will  occur in  the future.  Consider the 
following case (henceforth case A). 
Assume that there is a society with four citizens: one is 10 years old, one is 30, one is 50, 
and one is 70.  The second and the third citizens work; their gross income is  100 ECU 
each.  The oldest citizen is retired; his pension is 40 ECU.  Suppose GDP is equal to the 
sum of  workers' product (200 ECU). The contributory rate on workers' income, which 
corresponds to the ratio of pension expenditure on GDP,  is  20 per cent.  Assume that 
incomes and pensions grow at a constant rate and that this rate is equal to the interest 
39  A large futw'e pension expenditw'e may obviously influence the attitude towards public bonds, but this is an 
indirect effect. 
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rate.  40  Also assume that every citizen works from  20 to 60,  that pensions accrue at  a 
constant  rate  during  working  years  (with  a  present  value  of 1 ECU per year),  that 
everyone lives 80 years. The retired citizen accrued rights amount at 400 ECU (  40 ECU 
times 10 years of  expected life); the two workers' accrued rights amount to 800 ECU ( 10 
ECU times 20 years of  expected life in retirement for the first worker+ 30 ECU times 20 
years for the second worker). Altogether pension liabilities amount to 6 times GDP. The 
contributory rate is set to remain stable at 20 per cent. 
Now, suppose that (let's call this case B), all things being equal, there are three workers 
aged 50 (the 'baby boom' generation). Pension liabilities and GDP are, respectively, 2400 
and 400 ECU (since there are now four workers); the ratio between the two is,  like in 
case A, equal to 6. Pension expenditure is presently 10 per cent ofGDP, but in  10 years' 
time it will rise to 60 per cent and become unsustainable.  41 
This  example  makes  it  clear  that  any  judgement  about  the  sustainability  of pension 
schemes requires estimates about the resources available to pay for the accrued pensions, 
namely  about  the  evolution  of employment  and  per  capita  income.  Accrued-to-date 
liabilities do not include such estimates.  All  one can say is that the larger the ratio of 
pension rights to GDP,  the higher the  share  of future  public  resources  committed to 
pension expenditure and the higher the risk that, if  GDP growth is not adequate,  some 
adjustment will become necessary (in terms of  higher tax rates, of  repudiation of  pension 
rights, etc.) 
Accrued-to-date liabilities are nevertheless relevant in two respects. 
i)  Changes in the level of  accrued rights in real terms signal that there is a divergence 
between the cash deficit and the accrual deficit. If  citizens perceive these changes as 
changes in  their assets,  they may alter their c<;>nsumption  and  savings  behaviour. 
Estimates of  accrued rights may therefore be relevant in the evaluation of  the impact 
of  fiscal policy. This topic has been extensively examined in many works concerning 
the so-called Social Security Wealth.  42 
ii)  The levels of accrued  rights measure the cost of closing  down a PA  YG scheme 
when fully  complying with present rules concerning benefits.  43  If there is  a switch 
from a PAYG system to a funded system, and all new contributions are paid into the 
new  system,  accrued  rights  measure the  amount  of resources  which  have  to be 
financed  out of general taxation.  According to Van den Noord and Herd ( 1993) 
40  In many countries pensions are indexed to price dynamics. Therefore, the assumption that relates them to wage 
dynamics tends to overestimate pension expenditure. On the other hand, in many countries there are rules that 
work the opposite way.  For instance, pensions are frequently based on the wages earned in the latter part of 
working life, which are often higher than the average real wage earned during the whole life. 
41  If  the discount rate were assumed to be higher than the rate of growth of  wages, in case B the pension-debt to 
GDP ratio would be lower than in case A. Case B would even appear less worrying than case A. 
42  As  already  noted,  Social  Security  Wealth  is  usually  defmed  in tenns  of present  workers'  and  present 
pensioners' rights (see Rossi and Visco,  1994).  Data presented in Table 2  make it clear, nevertheless, that 
accrued rights represent most of  these rights. 
43  See World Bank (1994). estimates, in order to switch to full  funding in 30 years (without increasing budget 
deficits), the tax to GDP ratio ought to be increased by about 5 points in Germany 
and the UK, by 7 points in France and by 8 points in Italy.44 
This aspect of pension liabilities is stressed by Buchanan (1983, p.  349), who notes 
that the huge costs of  closing the US Social Security system explain why the system 
is supported by individuals who "recognize that their investment of  tax payments in 
the system are much less advantageous than their opportunities for investment in the 
market."  According to Buchanan (p.  353),  since the government  is  not likely  to 
default on the pension debt, the only way out of the P  A  YG system is the issue of 
new conventional debt "intended to insure that all future generations, along with the 
present one,  share equally in the costs imposed by the mistakes of almost half a 
century."  This  is  surely  a  straightforward  solution.  Whether  it  is  feasible  and 
desirable, is another matter.45 Points b), c), and d)  suggest that the pension debt may 
be more  manageable  than  the  conventional  debt.  It  can  also  be  argued  that,  if 
pension  benefits  are  linked  to  contributions,  the  latter  are  likely  to  be  less 
distortionary  than  other  taxes.  46  It  would  therefore  be  preferable  to  levy 
contributions earmarked to pension schemes than to resort to general taxation to 
finance the interest expenditure on the new conventional bonds. 
5. The relevance of new net liabilities 
Present pensioners'  and  workers' liabilities  and  Open-system liabilities include pension 
rights that are yet to accrue.  Strictly speaking, these pension rights should not even be 
called liabilities, but potential liabilities. They cannot therefore be in any way assimilated 
to conventional public debt, which is a backward looking statistic. 
New expected rights may have,  instead, a role in the assessment of the perspectives of 
pension schemes. For this purpose it is necessary to net new expected pension rights of 
the expected contributions that will be paid to pension schemes. The evaluation of  future 
contributions involves the methodological problem considered in Section 3. 
New net pension rights can be estimated for different "generations" of born and unborn 
citizens. These estimates are obviously relevant in the assessment of  the role of  the public 
sector in the distribution of resources among different generations. The data reported in 
44  In order to understand these estimates, it may be helpful to reconsider the case of the four citizens' economy 
outlined above (with accrued liabilities equal to 600 per cent of  GDP). In this economy, in order to switch to 
full funding in 30 years the workers should provide additional resources equal to 20 per cent of GDP.  In the 
first 10 years these revenues would pay for the pensions of  the present 70 year old citizen; in the following 20 
years they would pay for the pension of the 50 year old citizen and set up a fund equivalent to the pension 
rights of  the 30 year old citizen. 
45  During the eighties,  when Chile switched from  PAYG to a  funded pension system,  the creation of new 
conventional debt was limited by the large budget surplus build up by the government and by sales of public 
enterprises. The 'recognition bonds' that were paid to the workers that decided to switch to the new system as a 
compensation for their accumulated entitlements were not transferable or redeemable before their retirement. 
See Diamond (1993) and World Bank (1994). 
46  See also Bohn's (1992,  p.  45) arguments on the relationship between the smaller distortionary effects of 
contributions linked to social-security benefits and the risk of  default on the pension-debt. 
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Table 2 make it clear that the return on the contribution paid may vary considerably for 
the different generations of  citizens. 
Future  rights  are  positive  when  the  discounted  flow  of benefits  is  higher  than  the 
discounted flow of  contributions; they are negative when the former flow is smaller than 
the latter. But what is the economic meaning of positive and negative net future rights? 
Do they actually  imply that there is a net payment by the government to a particular 
generation or that,  conversely, there is a net payment by a particular generation to the 
government? Do they say anything about  pressure on the budget stemming from PA  YG 
schemes? Or about the sustainability of  pension policy? 
Let us first begin with the following identity, that simply states that in a "pure" PAYG 
system in any period of  time the total amount of  contributions must be equal to the total 
amount of  pensions: 
cwN1 =pNp 
Where  c is the contribution rate levied on wages 
w is the average wage 
N1 represents the number of  workers 
p is the average pension 
Np represents the number of  pensioners. 
Suppose each citizen works in  the first  half of his/her life  and  gets a  pension in  the 
following half  In period 1: 
cl  =  c wl N11  and  p1 = c w1 N11fNpl 
Where C is the total amount of  contributions. In period 2: 
c2 = c w2 N12 = c wl N11  (1 + w*) (1 + n1*)  and 
p2 = c w2 Nt2/ Np2 = c w1  N11  (1 + w*) (1 + n1*) I N1l 
Where w* is the rate of  growth of  wages 
n1* is the rate of  growth of  workers 
The rate of return on the contributions paid to the P  A  YG scheme  (let's  call  it rc)  is 
therefore: 
rc =  p2Jcw1- 1 =  w* + nt* + w* n1* 
If cis constant over time; w,  N1  and Np dynamics are exogenous; and .P  is  adjusted in 
each period of  time in order to balance expenditures with revenues, the rate of  return on 
contributions is  approximately equal  to the sum of the rates of growth of per capita 
wages and of  the number of  workers.  47 
47  See Aaron 1966). In this case, if  rc = w*+nt * > r (the discount rate), net future rights are positive. As long 
as w*+n1 * > r,  48 by enrolling in a P  A  YG scheme, each generation gets a net payment that 
it would not have received had it enrolled in a funded scheme investing at a rate equal to 
r.49  In  this  specific  situation,  positive  rights  do  not  imply  any  net  payment  by  the 
government to a particular generation, or any need to adjust contribution rates,  or any 
pressure on the budget.  More generally,  a P  A  YG pension policy is  sustainable,  in the 
sense that it does not require any change in rules, as long as  rc = w*+n1 *. 
Let's come back to the assessment of  pension liabilities. In this case, the rules concerning 
p are held constant over time.  This means that,  even if the amount of contributions is 
equal to that of  pensions in period 1, this need not happen in period 2. In other words, rc 
is no longer necessarily equal to w*+n1 *.  In this case, net pension rights are still positive 
if the  implicit  return  on  contribution  is  greater  than  the  return  rate  assumed  as  a 
benchmark  (i.e.,  if rc  >  r),  but the  sign  of net  pension  rights  does  not  convey  any 
information on  whether or not there is an imbalance in the P  A  YG scheme.  It provides 
no information on whether  rc > w*+n1*  or rc < w*+n1*, which is the relevant aspect in 
assessing the need to modify pension policy. 
The sign and the dimension of  pension rights obviously depend on the choice of  r, which, 
as the survey carried out in Section 3 has shown, is rather arbitrary. If  r is very high, even 
a  scheme  where  rc  is  much  higher  than  w*+n1 *  would  show  negative  net  rights. 
Conversely, if r is very low, even a scheme where rc is much lower than w*+nt* would 
show positive net rights. 
In conclusion,  positive  net  rights  do  not  imply  that  the  pension  system  is  presently 
unbalanced  in  cash  terms  or that  it  will  become  unbalanced  within  a  certain  time.  50 
Neither do they imply that some adjustment will have to take place in the future.  On the 
other hand,  there  may  exist  circumstances  in  which  even with  null  or negative  new 
expected rights the pension system can exert large cash pressure on the budget. It may be 
useful  to refer  again  to cases  A  and  B  introduced  in  Section 4.  In  both cases,  the 
expected new net rights are null since each worker is supposed to pay 20 per cent of  his 
income  for  40  years  in  order  to  get  40  per  cent  of his  income  for  20  years.51 
Nevertheless, in case A there is no need for adjustment, while in case B the retirement of 
the three 50 year old citizens requires a major adjustment in contribution rates,  or in 
benefits, or in budgetary transfers. 
It would be more relevant to provide estimates of  rc and to compare them with present 
and  future  values  of w*+nt  *.  Unless  one  assumes  that  a  certain  rate  of return  on 
48 Although this condition (which gives rise to the so-called "social insurance paradox") is not necessarily efficient 
in a steady state situation (see Felderer 1993 and the papers he quotes), past experience has shown that it may 
occur for long periods oftime (see, for instance, for Italy Gronchi et al.  1994  ). 
49  Obviously, as Aaron (1966, p. 374) notes: "If saving and, hence, investment and, hence, the rate of  growth of 
income are reduced as the level of  social insurance increases, this conclusion does not necessarily follow." But 
this is another matter. 
50  This point is also made in Consiglio tecnico-scientifico della programmazione ( 1994  ). 
51  Remember that wage and pension growth rates are supposed to be equal to the interest rate. 
21 22 
contributions represents a normative benchmark for the assessment of P  A  YG schemes, 
any comparison between rc and an arbitrary r does not  lead very far. 
Had estimates of new net rights been carried out in the sixties and the seventies,  they 
would have probably shown large positive values.  Two factors would have contributed 
to that result:  rc was in many countries higher than it is  now;  the value chosen for r 
would have probably been lower than those chosen in the more recent papers examined 
in Section 3.  Despite their limited economic relevance, the large positive values would 
have implicitly signaled that citizens were granted very high returns on contributions, and 
that these returns were unlikely to be continuously matched by a high level of w*+n1 *. 
The availability and the diffusion of  estimates might have limited the tendency to improve 
pension  benefits  and  might  have  accelerated the  reform of pension  schemes.  Recent 
estimates,  that  take  the  reforms  of the  eighties  and  the  nineties  into  account,  are 
apparently less worrying. Van den Noord and Herd (1993) record negative or nearly null 
new net rights in four out of  the seven countries that they consider. In spite of that, due 
to the decline in w*+n1*,  the situation of pension systems is very worrying:  a declining 
number of  new workers is being called to service a large accrued debt. 
In  a  way,  estimates  of future  net  rights  were  not  available  when  they were  mostly 
needed. Now that they are available,  it is  apparent that in many countries the problem 
does not lie in avoiding that future net rights have positive values, but in cutting accrued 
rights and in getting new generations of  workers to accept negative net rights. 
6. Pension liabilities and fiscal policy assessment 
The  inclusion  of pension  liabilities  in  the  public  debt  definition  would  require  an 
analogous  change in the deficit  definition.  Contributions  would  become loans  to the 
public sector; pensions would be considered, in part, as loan repayment and in part as an 
implicit interest payment.  52 In this accounting system, an increase in contribution rates, all 
things being equal, would have no effect on current deficit, while it would reduce future 
deficit (since interest payments would be lower).  Any increase in the benefits promised 
for the future would increase current deficit and leave future ones unchanged. 
There are practical as well as theoretical reasons for avoiding the inclusion of  pension 
liabilities in the deficit and debt statistics that are used in defining current fiscal policies.  53 
a)  The conventional public debt can be measured rather precisely and unambiguously at 
any  point  in  time.  Pension  liabilities  are  uncertain  and  depend  on  the  specific 
hypothesis  adopted upon a  variety of factors,  such as  life  expectancy,  price  and 
52  This solution is supported in Kotlik  off ( 1984). Towe ( 1991, p.  117) notes that "proponents of this system do 
not address the issue of decomposing  benefit payments into 'principal' and 'interest'.  Presumably, actuarial 
criteria could be applied." 
53  Brittan (1993) takes a very radical view on the matter: "According to an ancient sage there are three kinds of 
human ills: those inflicted by providence, those inflicted by our fellow men and women, and those we inflict on 
ourselves. The scare campaign to increase the size of  estimated government debt by adding in unfunded public 
sector pension liabilities belongs to this last category." wage trends,  etc.  Present value calculations are extremely  sensitive to changes in 
assumptions.  As  Boskin  et  al.  (1987,  p.  45)  point  out,  referring  to the  U.S.A.: 
"Moving  all  of the  economic  and  demographic  projections  from  intermediate  to 
either optimistic or pessimistic (assumptions) results in a change which is larger than 
the privately held  national  debt."  The  effects  on deficit  estimates would  even be 
relatively larger. This means that, as Blejer and Cheasty (1991, p.  1675) point out at 
the end of  their survey concerning the literature on net worth concepts of  the deficit, 
"net worth measures could be dangerous if  used for near-term fiscal policy." 
b)  As mentioned  in  Section 4,  pension rights  are acquired  compulsorily and  are not 
tradable.  They  produce  no  direct  effect  on  financial  markets.  The  inclusion  of 
pension liabilities in the debt and deficit measures would obscure the pressure of  the 
public sector on financial markets.  The case of  Italy may again be relevant. Despite 
the  fact  that  the  1992  reform  wiped  out  pension  liabilities  equal  to  Italian 
conventional debt,  the role of the public  sector in  the financial  markets have  not 
changed significantly. 
c)  As it was pointed out in Section 4,  pension liabilities cannot be fully assimilated to 
conventional liabilities.  The most relevant difference regards the fact  that pension 
liabilities  can be  reduced  by  changing  benefit  rules:  major  pension  reforms  have 
reduced  the  future  entitlements  of current  workers  and  pensioners.  Indexation 
mechanisms, retirement ages, eligibility rules and other aspects of  the pension system 
have been frequently modified in recent years in Western countries. Consequently it 
would be erroneous to assume that pension programs represent a firm legal or moral 
commitment.  54 
d)  Another reason for not including pension liabilities in public debt definition concerns 
the  negative  effect  that this  action might  have  on pension  reforms.  As  it  is  put 
forward  by  Boskin  (1982):  "I  would  not  wish  to  have  the  current  rules  and 
regulations of  the social insurance program cemented into a unified capital account 
of the  government  as  if we  had  issued  explicit  long-term  contractual  debt 
obligations,  that  is,  I  do  not want  to enshrine  pay-as-you~go financing  of these 
programs and government activities at current projected levels". 
e)  Although  pension liabilities  surely  affect  consumption  and  saving  decisions55,  the 
magnitude of  the impact is not necessarily equal to that of  public financial liabilities. 
Pension rights holders may have limited foresight,  may not trust present or future 
government's capacity to deliver the full  pensions they are entitled to under present 
rules, may be cash-constrained, may live in a world with imperfect capital markets. 
54  One should nevertheless consider that the implementation of large cuts in pension rights may obviously raise 
political reactions, and that these reactions are likely to  increase with the gradual shift of political power 
towards the older generations. As Borsh-Supan (1991, pp; 129-130) notes:  "In West Gennany after 2020  the 
majority of the voters will be pensioners and workers who will become retired within the next 10 years.  We 
then risk facing  a typical free-rider situation as the older generation can outvote the younger generation in 
determining their retirement income as well as the rate of social security taxes the younger generation has to 
pay". 
55  As to  savings,  see  for  instance Rossi  and  Visco  (1994) who  suggest that the growth of PA  YG  schemes' 
liabilities contributed substantially to the decline in Italian saving ratio between the sixties and the eighties. 
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The inclusion of pension rights in debt and deficit  statistics on a one-to-one basis 
might, therefore, lead to an erroneous estimate of  the impact of  fiscal policy.  56 
f)  The addition of pension liabilities to the conventional public  debt would produce 
misleading  indications  of the  effects  of  changes  in  interest  rates  on  public 
expenditure  perspectives  and  budgetary  sustainability.  Since  accrued  pension 
liabilities are negatively related to the level of the interest rate,  any increase in this 
level  would  automatically  reduce  total  debt.  This  apparent  improvement  might 
correspond to an actual worsening of budgetary conditions due to the increase in 
interest expenditure. 
The inclusion of pension liabilities  in  debt  and  deficit  statistics would  obviously  also 
influence international comparisons of  public finance data. The amount of  the total public 
debt  would  depend  on  the  structure  of the  pension  system.  More  specifically,  the 
countries relying on P  A  YG schemes would record a higher debt than those relying on 
funding.  Since pension liabilities are usually larger than conventional debt, there would 
be major effects in the debt ranking of  different countries. 
In evaluating the new ranking one would have to keep in mind the previous points a), b), 
and  c):  the  sensitivity to assumptions,  the  power of governments  to reduce  pension 
rights, and the lack of direct effects on financial markets. Furthermore, one would have 
to consider  that neither theory nor past experience support the view that the recourse to 
PA  YG schemes rather than to funded  schemes necessarily implies a less sound public 
finance and a less efficient economy.  57 
Estimates  of pension  liabilities  may,  nevertheless,  represent  a  useful  complement  to 
conventional  debt  and  deficit  measures.  As  has  been  shown  in  the  two  previous 
paragraphs,  they bring  a  clearer  understanding  of fiscal  impact  on consumption  and 
saving  ratios,  of deficits  in  accrual  terms,  and  of the  economic  balance  of pension 
schemes. Furthermore: 
a)  they would highlight the future cost of  present pension policies; 
b)  they would reduce the incentive "for fiscal authorities to substitute away from cash 
to noncash activities as a means of circumventing constraints on the overall cash-
based deficit or expenditure".  58 
As it has been pointed out in the previous sections, the evaluation of pension liabilities 
requires detailed information on national pension systems.  This information is probably 
available only at national level.  International organisations might play an important role 
in defining uniform methodologies with the aim of achieving internationally comparable 
estimates and contributing to a better control of  budgetary policies at country level. 
56  This point is extensively examined in Mackenzie (1989). 
57  The PA  YG versus fimding argwnent is very complex and is beyond the scope of  this paper. See, for instance, 
the papers in OECD (1992) and Sartor (1993). 
58  Towe (1991, p.  126). It should be already clear that, despite their intuitive appeal,  estimates of pension-debt 
cannot provide any  answer to the following  questions:  a)  "Can the current course of 
fiscal  policy  be  sustained,  without  exploding  -- or imploding  -- debt?  Or will  the 
government  have  to  increase  taxes,  decrease  public  spending,  have  recourse  to 
monetisation,  or  even  repudiation?"59;  b)  what  effects  will  the  changes  in  the 
demographic  structure,  namely the ageing  process,  exert on Western countries public 
finance  in  the  future?;  c)  what  pressure  will  PAYG  pension  schemes  exert  on  the 
budgets? 
Other  indicators  should  be  used.  Budgetary  sustainability  should  be  assessed  more 
precisely  and  comprehensively  with  an  accounting  framework  that  considers  all 
budgetary  items.  60  This  approach  would  also  avoid  some  methodological  difficulties 
encountered in defining the future revenues of  pension schemes. 
Although pension schemes are likely to exert the greatest strains on western countries' 
budgets  in  the  next  few  decades,  a  wider  approach  would  also  be  useful  in  the 
assessment of the effects of ageing.  Demographic changes will actually influence most 
expenditure items61 :  population ageing  will increase health  care  expenditure  since  the 
consumption of  services raises steeply with age; it will also increase the demand for some 
social services; the decline in the number of  young people will provide an opportunity to 
reduce  education  expenditure;  the  decline  in  total  population  growth,  and  in  some 
countries  the decline  of total  population,  might  reduce  the  requirements  for  capital 
expenditure. 
Short- and medium-term demographic effects might be assessed estimating the evolution 
of the  ratio  to  GOP  of the  different  expenditure  items  under  the  assumption  of 
unchanged  policies.  Long  term  effects  might  be  examined  with  general  equilibrium 
models taking the interaction of households,  producers,  and government behavior into 
account.62 
The short- and medium-term perspectives of  PA  YG pension systems might be examined 
with  indicators  that  are  simpler  and  more  transparent  than  pension  liabilities.  The 
expenditure to GOP ratio and the  contributi~n rate that assure the cash balance of the 
pension scheme would be appropriate. 
59  Blanchard (1990). 
60  See Auerbach et al. ( 1991) and Kotlikoff ( 1992  ). 
61  See, for instance, OECD (1988) and Pearson et al. (1989). 
62  See, for instance, Auerbach et al. (1989). 
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a) Accrued-to-date liabilities 
Accrued-to-date liabilities  (L) represent the present value of pensions to be paid in the 
future on the basis of  accrued rights. 
L=LP+LW 
with  LP  =  Present pensioners' liabilities 
L  W =  Present workers' liabilities. 
In  principle,  for each pensioner of age a one should  compute (assuming that nobody 
lives more than 100 years): 
100 
LPa =  ~  Bi Sj /(l+r)i-a 
i=a 
here  Bi represents his/her pension in year i 
Si represents his/her probability to be alive in year i 
r is the discount rate. 
By assuming that the pension increases at a constant rate (p  ), one obtains: 
100 
LPa =  Ba  ~  Sj ((l+p)/(I+r)) i-a 
t=a 
where Ba represents his/her present pension. 
The total present value of  pensions existing in year t (taking into account that disability 
pensions can be paid  also to young workers and  assuming that ·all  pensions start and 
expire at the beginning of  each year) is the following: 
2  100  t+80 
LPt =  ~  ~ 
s=l  j=20 
N·  B·  ~  S· ·  ((l+p)/(l+r}) i-t  J,S  J,S  lJ,S 
i=t 
where  s is the sex of  the pensioners 
Nj,s is the number of  pensions paid to pensioners of  sex s and age j in  year t 
Bj,s represents the average pension paid to pensioners of  sex s and age j in year t 
Sj,i,s represents the probability to be alive in year i for pensioners of  sex s and 
age j in  year t. 
One should also take into account the present value of  the survivor pensions that might 
be  paid  after  the  pensioners'  death  (LPS)  and  the present  value  of present  survivor 
pensions paid to children (that usually expire when the recipients reach a certain age -
LPC). 
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Along the same lines, for each worker of  age b: 
100 
LWb =  Q  Bw r  Si  (l+p)/(l+r))J-a 
t=w 
where  w represents the expected retirement age 
Q represents the probability of  receiving a pension 
Bw the expected pension at retirement computed on the basis of  the 
contributions already paid to the pension scheme. 
The total present value of pensions accrued by present workers (assuming there are no 
workers under 20 works) is: 
2  100 
LWt = t  r 
s=I  j=20 
t+80 
Mi,s  B·  r  Q"  S· ·  ((l+p)/(l+r)) i-t 
J  J,S  IJ,S  l,J,S 
i=t 
where  s is the sex of  the pensioners 
Mj,s  is the number of  workers of  sex s and age j in  year t 
Bj,s  represents  the average  pension  paid  at  retirement to workers of sex  s 
and age j tn year t computed on the basis of  the contributions already paid to 
the pension scheme 
Oij,s represents the probability of  receiving a pension in year t for workers of 
sex s and age j in year t 
Sj,i,s represents the probability to be alive in year i for workers of  sex s and age j 
in year t 
Since the worker might die, leaving a wife or children entitled to a survivor's pension, or 
might  become  disabled,  the  expected  values  of both  survivors  (L  WS)  and  disability 
pensions (L  WI) should also be considered. 
Altogether, denoting with a superscript "a" this first definition of  pension liabilities: 
La: LPa + LPsa + LPca + Lwa + Lwsa + LWia 
It has to be noted that these estimates should be carried out for each  pension scheme 
existing in  a country,  since pension schemes usually have different rules and  different 
compositions of workers and  pensioners  (as to age,  sex,  wage,  contributory  periods, 
etc.) 32bis 
b) Current workers' and pensioners' liabitities 
These  represent  the  sum  of the  present  value  of accrued  rights  of workers  and 
pensioners, plus the present value of  the rights acquired in the future by present workers, 
minus the present value of  future contributions of  present workers (CW). 
While there is no change in LP, L  W becomes 
2  100  t+80 
LWt = E  E  Mj,s  Bj,s  r,  Qi,j,s  Si,j,s  ((l+p)/(l+r)) i-t 
s=l  j=20  i=t 
where  Bj,s represents the average pension paid at retirement to workers of  sex s and 
age j in year t computed on the basis of  ful1 working life. 
The present value of future  contributions of present workers (assuming nobody retires 
after 70) is equal to 
2  70 
CWt = E  :E  Mj,s  C 
s=l  j=-=20 
t+80 
r,  R· ·  Y· ·  (l+p)/(l+r)) i-t  1,j,S  I,J,S 
i=t 
where  C is the contributory rate on labour income 
Rj  J.  s  represents the probability of  working in year i for workers of  sex s and 
' '  age j in year t 
Yj,i,s represents the labour income in year i of  workers of  sex sand age j in year 
t. 
Denoting with superscript "b" this definition of  liabilities: 
Lb = LPa + LPsa + LPCa + LWb + LWSb + LWJb- cwb 
c) Open-system liabilities 
These  include  the  present  value  of accrued  and  future  rights  of present  workers  and 
pensioners, the present value of future contributions of present workers and the present 
value of contributions (  CWN) and  pension  (L WN)  of new  workers.  The latter can  be 
defined in many ways. 
In case only children living at year tare considered: 
2  19 
LWN1 =  :E  :E 
s=l  j=l 
100 
Tj,s  Bj,s  :E  Vi,j,s  Si,j,s  ((I +p)/(1 +r)) i-t 
i=t where  Tj s is the number of  children of  sex s and age j in  year t  , 
Vi,j,s  represents the probability of  receiving a pension in year i for children of 
sex s and age j in year t 
The expected value of  survivor (L  WSN) and disability (L  WIN) pensions of  new workers 
should also be estimated. 
2  19 
CWNt = l:  l:  tj,s  C 
s=l  j= I 
t+IOO 
l:  K· ·  Y· ·  (l+p)/(J+r)) i-t  lJ,S  l,j,S 
i=t 
Kij,s  represents the probability working in year t for children of  sex s and age j 
in year t. 
Denoting with superscript "c" this definition of  liabilities: 
LC  = LPa + LPSa  + LPCa + Lwh + LWSh  + LWib - cwb  + LWNC  + LWSNC  + 
LWINC-CWNC 
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